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Stacey Curry was killed while walking through a parking lot to
her office.1 She was struck and run over by a delivery truck.2 The
driver said he thought he had gone over a speed bump. The police
officer on the scene could not explain how the driver did not see
her: there were no parked cars limiting visibility, it was a sunny
day, and the posted speed limit was low.3 Telesfora Escamilla was

1. Patricia Callahan, Amazon Pushes Fast Shipping but Avoids Responsibility for the
Human Cost, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/us/
amazon-delivery-drivers-accidents.html.
2. Patricia Callahan, His Mother Was Killed by a Van Making Amazon Deliveries.
Here’s the Letter He Wrote to Jeff Bezos, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 5, 2019, 1:59 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/his-mother-was-killed-by-a-van-making-amazondeliveries-heres-the-letter-he-wrote-to-jeff-bezos.
3. See id.
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also killed by a delivery truck in a hurry.4 It was sunny when she
crossed the street in a marked crosswalk, three blocks from her
home, three days before Christmas.5 A twenty-two-year-old man
was killed when another delivery vehicle turned left into his
motorcycle.6 The driver was apparently distracted, or else not even
paying attention.7 These three and at least seven others were killed
by collisions with Amazon delivery trucks.8
Amazon exercises extraordinary control over its delivery
providers, determining the routes of vehicles, tracking movements,
and keeping time.9 Amazon also exercises control over hiring and
firing drivers,10 but it has been able to avoid liability for the ten
deaths and sixty other “serious injuries” caused by their vehicles by
placing a legal firewall between itself and the drivers—many of
whom drive Amazon-branded vans.11 Amazon separates itself
from the delivery-driver-tortfeasors by contracting with separate
companies, often limited liability corporations (LLC) financed by
Amazon, who drive the vehicles that provide the “final mile”
delivery services. These separate companies then employ or
contract drivers to perform the labor, insulating Amazon from
liability when a tort occurs. This allows Amazon to set stricter and
quicker delivery goals without being confronted by the liability for
the resulting torts, including the taking of human life.12
4. Caroline O’Donovan & Ken Bensinger, Amazon’s Next-Day Delivery Has Brought
Chaos and Carnage to America’s Streets—But the World’s Biggest Retailer Has a System to Escape
the Blame, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 6, 2019, 5:14 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/carolineodonovan/amazon-next-day-delivery-deaths.
5. Id.; Christian Farr, Former Amazon Driver Acquitted in Death of 84-Year-Old Woman,
NBC5 CHICAGO (Aug. 1, 2019, 7:55 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/
former-amazon-driver-acquitted-in-death-of-84-year-old-pedestrian/127151/.
6. Callahan, supra note 1.
7. O’Donovan & Bensinger, supra note 4. The driver thought he had hit a pole, when
in fact he had cut off the motorcyclist and braked, causing the motorcycle to lose control and
slide. Id.
8. See id.
9. Hayley Peterson, “Amazon Has All the Power”: How Amazon Controls Legions of
Delivery Drivers Without Paying Their Wages and Benefits, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 4, 2018, 9:54 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-controls-delivery-drivers-without-payingwages-2018-9.
10. David Ingram & Jo Ling Kent, Inside Amazon’s Delivery Push: Employees and Drivers
Say an Overworked System Is Lax on Safety as Packages Pile Up, NBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2019, 2:30
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/inside-amazon-s-delivery-push-employeesdrivers-say-overworked-system-n1087661.
11. Callahan, supra note 1.
12. See Peterson, supra note 9.
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Amazon is not the only company that uses subcontracted
services to shield itself from liability. It has been a long-standing
way for a company to reduce its own risk of liability by passing the
burden to a contractor or even a properly capitalized subsidiary.
Amazon is not alone in the field of companies relying on unskilled,
untrained labor to fulfill what, at times, can be extremely
dangerous work.
Similar liability maneuvers have empowered an entire
economy of so-called “gig companies.”13 Gig companies disrupt
established, often regulated industries, by connecting service
customers with “able” providers. Among the biggest names in the
gig economy, a common strategy has emerged which seems to
propel their success: identify a regulated industry, find loopholes
to reduce or eliminate the regulatory hurdles, and most
importantly, call yourself a tech company and distance yourself
from the end-provider.14 Though many gig workers perform
risky tasks, like driving, on strict deadlines, the employers mostly
avoid the cost of providing training or supervision. Even those
who require some level of training, supervision, or competency
checks must face the reality of a marketplace that incentivizes
the companies to grow their workforce at unprecedented rates,15
while minimizing labor costs.16 Part of that minimization is

13. Gig company refers to those entities that produce revenue by engaging in the gig
economy. The gig economy was recognized in Merriam-Webster’s “Words We’re Watching”
and added to the dictionary in 2019. Words We’re Watching: “Gig Economy”, MERRIAM WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/gig-economy-use-originphrase (last visited May 1, 2021). First used in 2009, gig economy refers to “economic
activity that involves the use of temporary or freelance workers to perform jobs typically
in the service sector.” Gig Economy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/gig%20economy (last visited May 1, 2021).
14. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(in suit brought by Uber drivers, the court dissects Uber’s arguments that it should not be
treated like a taxi company because it is a “‘technology company,’ not a ‘transportation
company’”).
15. SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, BROOKINGS INST., A PROPOSAL FOR
MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT
WORKER” 6 (Brookings Inst., 2015), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/
gig_economy_slides.pdf (presenting a chart of Uber driver growth).
16. Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/
uber-drivers-psychological-tricks.html (describing how Uber manipulates drivers in “a
quest for a perfectly efficient system: a balance between rider demand and driver supply at
the lowest cost to passengers and the company”).
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reducing or altogether eliminating the company’s liability for its
untrained workers.
In the “gig economy,” companies rely on various legal
maneuvers to prevent the negative impacts of their serviceproducts from costing the companies big. While Amazon and
others are able to use separate corporate entity arguments to avoid
the legal liability, the same technique would prevent gig companies
from expanding at the rate needed to capture investment dollars.17
If every individual driving for the ostensible “rideshare” company
was required to jump through the hoops of forming a separate
company there would not be enough drivers to service the user
base needed to make the company successful. Most gig companies
rely on other common law techniques to shield the companies from
liability. Uber has argued that all of its drivers are independent
contractors, precluding almost all company liability for acts of their
drivers under principles of respondeat superior.18 But as the
companies grow and deepen their pockets, the plaintiffs’ bar will
continue to challenge the assertion, sometimes with at least a
modicum of success.19 However, even when plaintiffs overcome the
independent contractor status, respondeat superior limits liability
to acts taken in pursuit of the employer’s business, leaving some
passengers no recourse against the companies for torts perpetrated
by drivers who were both vetted by the company and assigned by
the company to pick up the passenger.
Some jurisdictions have attempted to address the matter of
gig-worker independent contractor status legislatively, either
restricting the activities of gig companies or altogether preventing
the companies from operating due to the health and safety risks.20
17. See, e.g., Nathan Heller, Is Venture Capital Worth the Risk?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 20,
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/01/27/is-venture-capital-worth-therisk (lamenting venture capital’s effect on startups, specifically the push to quickly scale).
18. See, e.g., Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (D.D.C. 2015) (passenger
attacked by driver); Yi v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 18-C-355, 2018 WL 5013568 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15,
2018) (passenger paralyzed after crash caused by driver); Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 184
F. Supp. 3d 774 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (passenger raped by driver).
19. See, e.g., Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Donovan v.
DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985)) (reversing summary judgement on the
question of whether plaintiff Uber drivers are in fact independent contractors, explaining
that because factual issues existed for questions under the Donovan test the district court’s
finding was not a matter of law and therefore a jury was needed to resolve the factual disputes).
20. See, e.g., Adam Satariano & Amie Tsang, Uber Is Fighting to Survive in London After
Losing Its License, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/
business/uber-london.html.
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But those efforts have struggled to gain traction, been temporary in
nature, or been reversed by ballot initiatives.21 In California,
legislation classifying gig workers as employees was overturned by
a referendum backed by the gig companies, who leveraged the
threat of unemployment and higher fares to turn out gig-worker,
and rider, votes.22 The result in California is legislation that
classifies gig drivers as independent contractors. The legislation
excludes any application in tort-related claims, but the scenario
illustrates a potential path forward for the gig companies.
A final method that gig companies are pursuing to remove the
liability for employees’ and contractors’ torts is removal of the
human labor altogether—for example, by offering automated
drone delivery23 and driverless cars.24 This raises other questions
of liability which, although not addressed in this Note, may be
resolved in the same manner as those involving the torts of
gig-workers.
This Note addresses a new imbalance in the tort system caused
by the proliferation of gig companies in recent years. It starts by
looking at how the law is currently failing. It then addresses
approaches others have considered for dealing with the new
21. See Chris Marr, New Jersey Gig Worker Bills Go to Governor, But Not “Big One”,
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 13, 2020, 6:49 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/new-jersey-gig-worker-bills-go-to-governor-but-not-big-one (“[E]fforts to pass a
California-style worker classification law will start over immediately” after state congress
fails to meet the mark.); Uber Spared From London Ban Despite “Historical Failings”, BBC (Sept.
28, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54322579 (London court overturns Uber’s
ban on service within the city); Faiz Siddiqui, Uber, Other Gig Companies Spend Nearly $200
Million to Knock Down an Employment Law They Don’t Like—and It Might Work, WASH. POST
(Oct. 26, 2020, 12:19 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/09/
prop22-uber-doordash/ (Uber and others lobby and advertise the ultimately-successful
Proposition 22 in California, overturning a prior bill that challenged the independent
contractor status for gig workers).
22. Suhauna Hussain, Uber, Lyft Push Prop. 22 Message Where You Can’t Escape It: Your
Phone, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/
story/2020-10-08/uber-lyft-novel-tactics-huge-spending-prop-22 (“Last week the ridehailing app served users with a pop-up threatening that if voters failed to pass Proposition
22 on the Nov. 3 ballot, wait times and prices would ratchet up, and drivers would lose their
livelihoods. To move forward with ordering a ride, users had to tap the ‘confirm’ button on
the message.”).
23. Amazon Prime Air, AMAZON.COM, https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-PrimeAir/b? node=8037720011 (last visited Mar. 11, 2021).
24. Paul A. Eisenstein, Driverless Taxi Rides Are Headed Your Way this Year, NBC NEWS
(Feb. 19, 2018, 11:40 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/driverless-taxirides-are-headed-your-way-year-n849371; Alison Griswold, Alphabet Is Coming for Uber,
QUARTZ (Dec. 6, 2018), https://qz.com/1486469/waymo-googl-is-coming-for-uber-with-adriverless-taxi-service/ (“The driverless taxi race is on.”).
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dilemma in assigning liability. These approaches are insufficient
due to their disparate effects and the inefficiency of the judicial
process—they merely incentivize a perpetual game of creative legal
maneuvers for those who can afford the legal cost, without
addressing the issue. Because so much of the gig economy is driven
by transportation providers, a comparison to the evolution of taxi
regulation and liability will be briefly addressed; however, the
shortcomings of applying an industry-specific regulation to an
entire economy of gig companies proves too limiting. By
comparing the problem of gig-economy tort liability to the
nineteenth- and twentieth-century evolution of products liability,
this Note ultimately proposes assigning strict liability to the company
advertising its services. Finally, the Note concludes by briefly
hypothesizing how the changes might impact the gig companies.
I. GIG COMPANIES AND THE LAW CURRENTLY
Tort law is not currently equipped to handle industries that are
(1) wholly reliant on gig labor and (2) shielded from the gig
laborers’ tortious actions. In this world, a “technology company”
that derives most, if not all, of its revenue from a thirty percent
cut of every payment on its ride hailing app is able to tell a court
that it isn’t a taxi company, it’s a technology company.25 And a
trillion-dollar company can expend a monumental effort and sum
of money to make fast, cost-effective delivery a reality, yet still
insist that they have no control over its delivery drivers.26 If finding

25. See Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 839 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2016)
(Judge Posner opining that the City of Chicago can treat gig transportation companies
differently from taxi companies—effectively saying that they are different from taxi
companies—by comparing the two to cats and dogs, “Most cities and towns require dogs
but not cats to be licensed. There are differences between the animals. Dogs on average are
bigger, stronger, and more aggressive than cats, are feared by more people, can give people
serious bites, and make a lot of noise outdoors, barking and howling. Feral cats generally are
innocuous, and many pet cats are confined indoors. Dog owners, other than those who own
cats as well, would like cats to have to be licensed, but do not argue that the failure of
government to require that the ‘competing’ animal be licensed deprives the dog owners of a
constitutionally protected property right, or alternatively that it subjects them to
unconstitutional discrimination.”). But see Jennings Brown, Uber’s Big Claim that It’s Not
Really a Cab Company Is Bogus, EU Court Rules, GIZMODO (Dec. 20, 2017, 9:55 AM),
https://gizmodo.com/uber-s-big-claim-that-it-s-not-really-a-cab-company-is-1821461427
(reporting on the European Court of Justice declaring that Uber is a taxi company in the
European Union).
26. See generally, Callahan, supra note 1 (discussing the significant efforts by Amazon
to make fast delivery a reality while taking calculated steps to preserve a liability shield).
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creative ways to dodge liability and regulation are cornerstones of
the company’s ability to “innovate,” utilizing legal principles to
hold the actor accountable might require upending the status quo.
A. Respondeat Superior
The principle of respondeat superior holds that a party is
responsible for the acts of its employees “acting within the scope of
their employment.”27 Respondeat superior is a form of vicarious
liability for employers, holding the employer or company liable for
torts which come about as a consequence of their business actions.28
The intended result is that the social cost of doing business is partly
placed on the party that stands to benefit. In this case, that party
also happens to be best positioned to spread the cost of the risk in
the form of higher prices for customers.29 If customers benefit
enough to cover the social cost—passed on in the form of tort
litigation—perhaps the market can justify perpetuating the risk.
This satisfies the desire to make tort victims whole and the desire
to hold the businesses accountable for accidents “which may fairly
be said to be characteristic of its activities[,]”30 while also allowing
society—in the form of the market—to arbitrate whether the cost
is justified.
B. In the Service of the Employer
The subject of respondeat superior has been covered at length
by others, but it serves to expound its basic principles in assigning
liability, because respondeat superior is the current status quo for
service-related torts. An employer is liable for the acts of employees
who are engaged in actions in the furtherance of the business.31 Acts
beyond this purpose are not covered by the doctrine.32 Acts directly
linked to the business may be obvious, but in defining whether a
non-business action can be tied to the employer, courts will
generally look at whether the act fits the meaning of a “detour” or
27. Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994).
28. See Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 719 P.2d 676, 678–79 (Cal. 1986).
29. Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 456–57 (1923) (noting
the underlying principle of spreading the risk of inevitable torts across a larger group of
people by holding the employer liable, allowing the cost of torts to be incorporated in the
business costs).
30. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968).
31. Depew v. Crocodile Enters., Inc., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673, 676 (Ct. App. 1998).
32. Id.
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a “frolic.”33 A detour is a minor departure from the employer’s
charge, and torts during a detour may still create liability for the
employer. A frolic is a major departure from the order of the
employer, generally for the employee’s exclusive benefit.34 To
balance the classification of an act, a court might look at the time,
place, authorization, foreseeability and normalcy of the departure,
purpose, and common sense, among other factors.35 Thus, a
delivery driver who travels hundreds of miles into another state to
visit a friend instead of performing deliveries has likely gone off on
a frolic for which the employer will not be held accountable. But
another driver who stops mid-delivery for lunch might only be
considered to have detoured, resulting in liability for the employer
if the driver causes a vehicular accident on the way to the diner or
on the return to the delivery route.
Concepts of detour and frolic can get even more tangled in the
gig-economy context. Because the gig workers are frequently
permitted to set their own schedule and usually have the power of
election to choose or deny service requests, questions arise: At what
point is the gig worker going about the business of the employer,
and at what point are the actions truly a frolic? There may be an
obvious delineation between an Uber driver who is on a road trip
with her family and the same driver completing a ride with an Uber
passenger in tow, but what about the times between providing
rides to paying passengers?36 What about the time and space
between dropping off a customer and returning to a high-demand
area for the next pickup?37 Or the space between accepting a ride
request and picking up the customer?38 Each of these questions
33. Id. at 676–77; see also Karangelen v. Snyder, 391 A.2d 474 (Md. 1978) (evaluating
whether the actions of a police officer were adequately classified as a detour, rather than a
frolic, by the lower court).
34. Pyne v. Witmer, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1309 (Ill. 1989).
35. Karangelen, 391 A.2d at 476.
36. Uber maintains $1,000,000 insurance policy for accidents caused when en route to
pick up a rider, but significantly less for accidents caused while waiting for the next ride
request. Auto Insurance to Help Protect You, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/
insurance/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
37. E.g., Dan Levine, Uber Settles Wrongful Death Lawsuit in San Francisco, REUTERS (July
14, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-crash-settlement/uber-settleswrongful-death-lawsuit-in-san-francisco-idUSKCN0PO2OW20150715 (describing Uber’s
settlement with family of 6-year-old who was killed when an Uber driver struck her between
accepting Uber assignments).
38. Uber addresses this directly in its insurance policy for drivers, but without the
policy the line is not so clear. See id.
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raises more doubts about the efficiency of such a framework in
meting out liability to gig companies.
C. Independent Contractors
Beyond the question of whether the worker is going about the
master’s service, and significantly more important to the calculus
of liability, is the worker’s employment status. Almost exclusively,
gig workers are classified as independent contractors. For
respondeat superior claims, this is often a fatal distinction.
The majority rule for respondeat superior in cases involving
independent contractors says that if one hires an independent
contractor and “retain[s] no control over the manner of its
performance, he is not liable on account of negligence of the
contractor or his servants.”39 Thus, for the vast majority of gig
companies, the independent contractor status of gig workers
precludes liability from being attached to the gig company for the
tortious acts of the gig worker. The exceptions to this barrier for
respondeat superior liability include when the tortious act was
committed at the explicit behest of the employer40 or when the
employer fails to exercise a reasonable amount of care in the hiring
and retention of the independent contractor.41
The typical gig company hires independent contractors to
perform their services. The companies promote this arrangement as
a special benefit for the gig workers—the ability to set your own
hours and be your own boss—but the benefits are far more valuable
for the gig companies who save time and money by reducing
oversight, training, and management, not to mention by avoiding
otherwise mandatory unemployment, social security, and
Medicare taxes.
The typical gig company will also require its contractors to
accept and sign work contracts that stipulate the terms of the
relationship,42 including any ongoing obligations. For example, a
rideshare company uses these agreements and other verification
methods to qualify drivers who have demonstrably good driving

39. Zirkle v. Winkler, 585 S.E.2d 19, 20 (W. Va. 2003).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 410 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
41. Id. § 411.
42. Frequently, these agreements explicitly state that the gig worker is an
independent contractor.
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records, proof of private licensure,43 and liability insurance.44 In this
way, the companies can argue that they satisfy the requirement to
exercise reasonable care in the retention of competent contractors.
If a gig worker commits a tort that implicates the gig company, the
company can simply claim that the work contract has been
violated—placing a barrier between the company and subsequent
litigation while the termination also provides evidence that the
company has acted in a reasonable manner in the retention of
contractors. Testing the inapplicability of respondeat superior for
independent contractors is a two-edged sword that cuts both ways
in favor of the gig companies.
D. Recent Developments in Independent Contractor Tests
There have been recent developments in California,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut regarding the classification of
gig workers as independent contractors.45 Given the enormous
growth of gig economies, especially in densely populated areas,
these states are at the forefront of handling gig-worker rights. One
example of this classification change was in California, known as
Assembly Bill 5 (AB5), which codified a three-part test previously
expounded by the California Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations
West, Inc. v. Superior Court.46
In addition to the traditional independent contractor
requirement that (A) the work be free from the control and
direction of the employer, the Dynamex test also requires that
(B) the worker performs similar work outside the usual course of
hiring for the employer’s business, and that (C) the worker be
customarily and independently engaged in the established trade or
occupation for which nature the contracted work is being
43. Private, not commercial licenses are the norm for ridesharing companies.
44. For example, the requirements to drive for Uber in the United States include at
least one year of driving experience, valid U.S. driver’s license, an “eligible” four-door
vehicle, proof of residency, proof of insurance, and a personal photo. Uber separately obtains
the individual’s driving record and criminal history. Driver Requirements, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/requirements/ (last visited May 1, 2021).
45. Assemb. 5, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B
(2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-222(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2017); see also Assemb. 5936, 218th Leg. (N.J.
2019). Other states have gone the other direction, passing laws that classify some gig workers
as “marketplace contractors.” See, e.g., H.R. 7087, 2018 Leg. (Fla. 2018); H.R. 1286, 120th Gen.
Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018); H.R. 220, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2019); S.
1967, 1978 Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 1978).
46. Cal. Assemb. 5; Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).

1628

1629

Strict Liability for the Information Age

performed.47 This test is creatively known as the ABC test for
independent contractors.48 The purpose of California’s bill—and
those of the other states—was disappointingly limited. The bill was
created and passed to provide employee benefits for the gig
workers, not to extend tort liability to the gig companies.
Accordingly, even though these laws highlight the reclassification
of many gig workers as employees, the benefits extend only as far
as the drivers, not to the potential tort victims.
The reticence of these state legislatures to tackle the inherent
problem of tort liability in our gig economy is not entirely baffling.
The companies provide labor opportunities and tax revenue. They
are also popular. After AB5 was signed into law, Uber, Lyft, and
others were able to get a referendum on the ballot which created an
exemption in the ABC rule for gig drivers.49 The companies
threatened to raise fees or stop services if the proposition did not
pass, and the referendum passed with 59% of the vote.50 The
companies still raised their fees.51 The revision of the terms for
independent contractor status under bills like AB5 provides a clear
opportunity to extend the independent contractor test to tort claims
brought against those independent contractors. But instead, the
California bill only codified the ABC test “for purposes of claims
for wages and benefits arising under wage orders issued by the
Industrial Welfare Commission,” excluding tort claims.52 There
may be any number of justifications, but the simplest one makes the
most sense: there are more workers than tort victims.

47. Cal. Assemb. 5.
48. John Myers, A Flood of Proposed Changes to California’s AB 5 Awaits State Lawmakers,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-02-28/
proposals-change-ab5-independent-contractors-labor-law-california; Allison Yano, The
Devastating Ripple Effect of California’s New Gig Worker Laws, AM. GENIUS (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://theamericangenius.com/business-news/california-gives-part-time-workers-fulltime-benefits-with-ab5/.
49. Carolyn Said, Proposition 22, California Gig-Work Ballot Measure Backed by Uber and
Lyft, Passes, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 6, 2020, 4:39 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/
article/Proposition-22-California-gig-work-ballot-15699651.php.
50. Id.
51. Carolyn Said, Here’s What You’re Paying for Proposition 22, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 19,
2021, 11:00 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Here-s-what-you-repaying-for-Prop-22-15870617.php.
52. Assemb. 5, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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II. OLD APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING GIG LIABILITY
Some scholars have suggested that addressing tort liabilities in
a gig economy can be accomplished by relying on common law
doctrines of respondeat superior and other forms of vicarious
liability.53 However, years of data suggest that the gig companies
have routinely avoided liability by chiefly relying on those same
principles, gaining precedent in the process. This includes suits
claiming everything from wrongful death54 and property damage,55
to scooters causing trespass56 and private nuisance,57 to drivers
assaulting58 and raping59 passengers. At this point, the weight of
precedence far outweighs the notion of returning to the foundation
of these tort principles.
Reliance on common law forms of vicarious liability will only
result in long-term maneuvering by the companies to further
escape liability, perpetuating the problem and putting unnecessary
and inappropriate reliance on the judiciary to adapt our laws. It
would not be inconceivable, for instance, for Uber and other gig
companies to follow the example of Amazon, using principles of
corporation law and separate entities to create stronger barriers to
responsibility. What then of the common law?
III. HAVEN’T WE BEEN HERE BEFORE? TAXIS AND THE GIG

53. E.g., Agnieszka McPeak, Sharing Tort Liability in the New Sharing Economy, 49
CONN. L. REV. 171 (2016).
54. E.g., Annie McCormick, Woman Dies After Being Struck by Uber Driver in North
Philadelphia, ABC6 PHILA. (June 1, 2016), https://6abc.com/traffic/woman-dies-after-beingstruck-by-uber-in-north-philadelphia/1365836/.
55. E.g., Checkey Beckford, 4 Hurt After Uber Driver Jumps Curb, Plows into Phone Store,
Busy Restaurant in Chelsea: Police, NBC4 N.Y. (July 31, 2018), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/
news/local/car-hits-building-chelsea-uber-driver-nypd/524492/.
56. Lautemann v. Bird Rides, Inc., No. CV 18-10049 PA (RAOx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
123864 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2019).
57. Labowitz v. Bird Rides, Inc., No. CV 18-9329-MWF (SK), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
195982 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2019) (class action brought against scooter companies by mobility
and visually impaired plaintiffs whose access to and use of public sidewalks has been impaired).
58. E.g., Sage Lazzaro, An Uber Driver has been Charged with Strangling a Student in a
Dorm Parking Lot, OBSERVER (May 23, 2016), https://observer.com/2016/05/an-uber-driverhas-been-charged-with-strangling-a-student-in-a-dorm-parking-lot/.
59. E.g., Tracey Lien, WeHo Woman Sues Uber for Negligence after being Raped by Driver,
L.A. TIMES (July 21, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-uber-laassault-20160721-snap-story.html.
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ECONOMY
Many plaintiffs have attempted to classify Uber, Lyft, and
others as nothing more than taxi services, subject to the same
heightened standard of care for passengers as other common
carriers. Thinking about gig companies as taxis is an attractive
model for handling torts in the gig economy.60 Unfortunately,
although the evolution of taxi company liability provides an
optimistic model of developing similar liability for gig companies,
the regulations and precedent establishing the liability for taxi
companies is uniquely tailored to transportation-focused gig
companies. Applying the same rules to all gig companies will only
produce gaps and loopholes in the same way applying traditional
principles likely will.
Several of the most prominent gig companies are based on the
idea of ridesharing, an alternative to the traditional taxicab. In this
ridesharing economy, almost anyone with an insured vehicle and a
license to drive can participate as a service provider. Anyone with
the app can hail a ride. This business model skirts the expensive
regulations that bind regulated taxis.61 Existing taxi regulations
have arguably raised the cost of taxi fares, but they also provide
certain social benefits for the public and the workers engaged in the
industry, including public safety by requiring minimum training,
equality by requiring the taxis to provide a certain level of service
to every passenger, and competitive wages for drivers in some
areas by limiting the number of licensed cabs to prevent dilution of
the market, while capping fares to protect customers.62 Some cities
even collect special fees from taxi companies to help cover other
social costs associated with the industry.63
But the gig economy is not limited to rideshare services. Airbnb
links would-be hoteliers with people seeking a spare room or
house.64 Other companies provide cleaning, handyman, moving,
60. Consider a comparison of the argument (rejected by the court) in Association of
Independent Taxi Operators, Inc. v. Kern, 13 A.2d 374 (Md. 1940), to that used by gig companies
today: “The defendant contends that it has no liability because the management, direction,
control, and supervision of drivers is in the owners of the cabs . . . .” Id. at 376.
61. TRANSP. RSCH. BD., BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MOBILITY: EXAMINING THE RISE
OF TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED TRANSPORTATION SERVICES 38–51 (2016), https://www.nap.edu/
read/21875/chapter/5.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. About Us, AIRBNB, https://news.airbnb.com/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
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trucking, lawn care, and shopping services at the click of a button—
services provided not by employees, but by gig workers.
Nevertheless, the development of liability for taxi services is a model
for establishing liability for gig companies—with some limitations.
Traditional taxi companies are viewed as an appropriate
parallel because the structure is similar to many gig worker
relationships. While some taxi companies own the vehicles and taxi
licenses and employ drivers, often the company is nothing more
than an association of independent drivers. These independent
drivers own their own taxi-licensed vehicles and participate in an
association of taxi drivers who rely on the association’s dispatch,
training, regulatory, and other services.65 This relationship between
an independent taxi driver and her taxi association has many
parallels to the relationship between a gig worker and the gig
company. For one, the association does not employ the driver;
rather, the driver subscribes to the association’s service as a matter
of efficiency. In some situations, the association has no involvement
in the actual transportation service, but merely acts as a support
organization for the drivers.66
Despite this separation between taxi associations and drivers,
and the apparent legal divide created by the separate entity and
independent contractor status, decades of case law have resulted in
a system of liability for cab companies, which, coupled with nowestablished regulatory requirements in many jurisdictions, places
liability on the cab companies for the acts of their drivers.67
An obstacle with applying similar principles to gig companies
is that the companies do not all take on the same form, and the
specifically tailored regulation of taxi services does not provide a
flexible framework for dealing with a range of industries and
working arrangements under the gig umbrella. It does, however,
65. E.g., Ill. Transp. Trade Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 134 F. Supp 3d 1108, 1110 (N.D.
Ill. 2015) (in the precursor to Judge Posner’s cats-and-dogs comparison, supra note 25, court
notes plaintiff’s complaint that taxi associations responsible for training, safety courses,
continuing education, and ensuring that drivers and vehicles have been properly qualified
and inspected, while Uber and others have a lower standard).
66. See generally CITY OF BOS., TAXI CONSULTANT REPORT, DRAFT ES.4 (2013),
https://www.cityofboston.gov/news/uploads/6033_4_24_27.pdf; see also Ass’n of Indep.
Taxi Operators, Inc. v. Kern, 13 A.2d 374 (Md. 1940) (weighing taxi association’s defense
which was based in part on an explanation of its role in the taxi industry as a facilitator,
not supervisor).
67. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Yellow Cab Affiliation, Inc., 73 N.E.3d 1220 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)
(allowing claim against taxi association to continue because the association controlled the
appearance of the taxi and the logo on its side).
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demonstrate how changing perceptions of the public and the
judiciary, coupled with increasing rates of litigation, may be a
signal to the courts, regulators, and legislators that the opportunity
to make changes to the law is ripe.
IV. IS IT TIME TO EXPAND STRICT LIABILITY TO SERVICES?
A. The Purposes of Tort Law
There is no perfectly unified theory of tort law that adequately
addresses all of its purposes. While this Note relies on surface-level
abstractions of the underlying motivations for liability,
compensation, and other damages, other articles suggest that this
isn’t enough to understand the true purposes underlying tort law.68
It does, however, suffice the purposes of this Note to claim that
fulfillment of the surface-level purposes of tort law is enough to
justify a closer look. The purposes of tort law are fourfold:
(1) compensation, indemnity, or restitution to the harmed party in
an effort to make them whole; (2) determination of rights;
(3) punishment of wrongdoers and appropriate deterrence of the
wrongful conduct; and (4) vindication of the parties to deter
retaliation and unlawful self-help.69 Chief among the considerations
for liability in the gig economy are restitution and appropriate
deterrence. And the most appropriate model of tort liability to
fulfill these purposes in this context is strict liability for services.
B. Origins of and Justifications for Strict Products Liability
Products liability largely developed due to the increasing
limitations of the doctrine of privity on would-be tort plaintiffs.70
Under the doctrine of privity, a person injured by a product could
only sue someone who was party to the contracted sale of the
product.71 With this limitation, retailers shielded the manufacturer
or producer from liability for torts caused by the product, because
the consumer was not in privity with the manufacturer—the
consumer was only in privity with the retailer. Over the years,

68. See, e.g., Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320 (2017)
(suggesting that the under purpose of tort law is to create community).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).
70. See generally Morton R. Covitz, Comment, Products Liability: The Rise and Fall of
Privity, 3 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 259 (1962).
71. Id. at 259.
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courts identified the imbalance of incentives the privity
requirement created, and the requirements were loosened. First,
courts removed the requirement in situations where the defect or
inherently dangerous product was fraudulently concealed.72 In
1916, a New York case completely removed the privity requirement
for any product that is likely to cause injury if negligently made.73
Courts would later remove the fraud requirement altogether—a
concealed defect coupled with putting the product into the
marketplace was enough.74 From there, the expansion of products
liability has developed to include liability for express warranties,75
implied warranties,76 invalidation of disclaimers of implied
warranty liability,77 and ultimately strict lability in tort for defective
products.78
The justifications for strict liability for defective products do not
provide the full picture regarding its development, but they are
informative when considering the evolution of a body of tort law to
address a specific inadequacy in the law. One justification for strict
products liability is that negligence is often too difficult for the
injured party to prove. The burden of proof is especially heavy in
an economy where the producer is often several degrees separated
from the consumer—both by middlemen facilitators and
geography. A second justification is that strict liability incentivizes
safety. The safety argument has two parts. First, manufacturers are
on notice of the strict liability nature of an offense, incentivizing the
creation of products that will not cause litigation. Second, by

72. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 634 (Wash. 1913) (“It has been accepted as a
general rule that a manufacturer is not liable to any person other than his immediate
vendee . . . without privity of contract no suit can be maintained; [but] . . . certain exceptions
have been recognized: (1) [w]here the thing causing the injury is of a noxious or dangerous
kind[;] (2) [w]here the defendant has been guilty of fraud or deceit in passing off the article[;]
(3) [w]here the defendant has been negligent in some respect with reference to the sale or
construction of a thing not imminently dangerous.” (emphasis added)).
73. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
74. Jack Roach-Bissonnet, Inc. v. Puskar, 417 S.W.2d 262, 275 (Tex. 1967)
(“Under Section 402B it is unnecessary that the ‘misrepresentation’ be made fraudulently or
negligently.”); Fisher v. Johnson Milk Co., 174 N.W.2d 752, 753 (Mich. 1970) (affirming
summary judgement where there was no “hidden or concealed defect” in the product).
75. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1932).
76. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
77. Id.
78. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); see also Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (discussing
the merits of a strict liability schema for defective products).
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reducing the burden on the plaintiff, it incentivizes potential
plaintiffs to bring the claims. Putting the burden on the
manufacturer is appropriate because the manufacturer is in the best
position to prevent or mitigate the harm by designing and
producing safe products free from defects. Additionally, the
manufacturer is able to spread the cost of each claim across a larger
swath of people, by incorporating the cost of damages into the
pricing of the product. Finally, manufacturers induce consumer
reliance on the expectation of safety when they put the product in
the marketplace and therefore have a moral duty to stand behind
their products.79
The development of strict liability for defective products did
not necessarily come about simply from judges weighing the
positives and negatives of these justifications. The requirement of
privity enjoyed a long-lasting tenure, bolstered by stare decisis,
with judges reticent to go against the grain and complicate a large
body of not only tort, but the many other commercial laws
depending on the principle and protection of privity.80 What the
anti-privity movement needed was a boost.
C. The Industrial Age’s Role in Products Liability
The evolution of products liability was catalyzed by the
Industrial Revolution.81 During and after the Industrial Revolution,
consumers were newly and increasingly separated from producers
due to the development of industrial age factories and the advent
of the steam engine, which more readily provided overland
transport of the goods produced in the industrial cities to
consumers across the country and world.82 Before this time, privity
between the producer and the consumer was commonplace;
however, this trend of separation continued to accelerate, and by
the end of World War II, consumers were largely separated from

79. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–41.
80. Consider here the comparative dilemma currently faced by judges and legislatures
dealing with the classification of gig workers.
81. Covitz, supra note 70, at 259.
82. University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, The Ways that Industrialization Altered
Patterns of Consumption, FOUNDS. OF W. CULTURE: THE INDUS. REVOLUTION (2016),
http://foundations.uwgb.org/group-11/.
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producers, maintaining privity with middlemen retailers instead.83
The departure from the privity requirement was a recognition “that
a sale of goods in 1961 differs from a corresponding sale in 1861.”84
Instead of privity of contract between one consumer and one
producer as before, industrialized America was increasingly
condensed among fewer and fewer producers who relied on
middlemen to complete the sale to consumers85—separating the
producer from consumer effectively eliminated privity between the
two parties, and by extension, the liability of the producer for
claims of the consumer.86 One argument used in the rebuttal of the
privity requirement was that advertisements and labels were
enough inducement to the consumer to justify holding the
manufacturer accountable for later injury to a “consumer who buys
the product in reliance on such representations and later suffers
injury because the product proves to be defective or deleterious.”87
But the altogether elimination of the privity requirement took time
and developed over decades.
D. The Information Age’s Role in Service Liability
Many of the same problems created by producer-consumer
segregation in the Industrial Age have been resurrected in this
latest phase of the Information Age. Where products and producers
previously reigned, services and providers now dominate. And
where the relationship between producer and consumer was
previously disrupted during the Industrial Revolution, creating
greater separation as producers consolidated separate from retail,
today the relationship between the purveyor of services and the
recipient has also evolved. The effect is analogous to the

83. Emanuel Emroch, Caveat Emptor to Strict Liability: One Hundred Years of Products
Liability Law, 4 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 155 (1970) (noting the scientific and economic explosion
following World War II that propelled the transformation “from the ancient mercantile
society, where the seller and buyer usually met and bargained, to an impersonal market
characterized by corporate organization, industrial and technological advancement and
complexity, and sophisticated marketing and finance”).
84. Covitz, supra note 70, at 265.
85. The Development of Industrial United States 1870–1900, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST.,
https://americanhistory.si.edu/presidency/timeline/pres_era/3_657.html (last visited
Feb. 8, 2021).
86. The first producer to adopt this model set the stage for Uber and others some 100
years later in their efforts to remove the burden of liability to consumers of its services and
the general public.
87. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612, 615–16 (Ohio 1958).
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breakdown of privity in products liability. Today, the separation of
gig companies from the gig consumers has created a legal barrier
that often prevents anyone from holding the companies
accountable for its services.
This isn’t the first time strict liability for services has been
discussed. In the years during and after the period of strict products
liability development, the question of differentiating between
services and products was frequently addressed by courts.88
Ultimately, the majority concluded that it was not time to extend
the protection of strict liability to services. The justifications for not
extending strict liability to services are threefold. First, the Second
Restatement of Torts did not intend to include services within the
umbrella of strict liability. Second, the idea of “defectiveness” is a
meaningless standard for services. And finally, the application of
strict liability for specific kinds of services is not warranted, either
due to the nature of the service or because portions of the strict
liability standard do not analogize as well as other bodies of law
which may be applied in the circumstance.89
The major flaws of the first and third justifications stand on
their own regardless of how strict liability is being applied.90
Whether or not the Restatement intended to include services within
strict liability has no bearing on its application now. As for the
application of strict liability for specific services, this can be carved
out where appropriate. In areas where other regulations and
existing tort schemes already provide a level of protection for the
consumer, it may not be prudent to upend the status quo. However,
the second, questioning the rationale of applying strict liability to
service providers, has greater relevance now than ever. The
argument then furthered by those opposed was that “[t]he salient
feature of defectiveness is that (unlike negligence) it purports to
evaluate the product rather than the manufacturer’s conduct.”91 In
this way, opponents comment that by extending strict liability to
88. E.g., Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (Ct. App. 1973) (blood
transfusion was a service, not a product, so no strict liability for plaintiff who contracted
hepatitis from the transfusion); Kissel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964) (excavation was a service, not a product, so no strict liability for damages causes by
faulty excavation); Pierson v. Sharp Mem’l Hosp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 673 (Ct. App. 1989) (strict
liability not warranted for services rendered at hospital).
89. William C. Powers, Jr., Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict
Liability, 62 N.C. L. REV. 415, 421–23 (1984).
90. See, e.g., id. at 419–20.
91. Id. at 420 (citing Phillips v. Kinwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974)).
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services, the court would have to evaluate conduct. This misses the
point. The purpose is to evaluate results of the service, not the
provider’s conduct.92 The alternative is no different than a
negligence standard.
Extending strict liability to services seeks to promote a number
of positive externalities—just as it does in the scope of products
liability: (1) promote safety, (2) spread the cost of risk, (3) reduce
the burden created by information asymmetry, (4) fulfill consumer
expectations of service safety, (5) put the burden on the party
best able to prevent injury, and (6) encourage fairness by holding
the party who benefits most from the risk accountable.93 Before
the rise of gig companies, purposes three and four were
seen as “distinctions” between products and services—two
arguments that at the time were applied to products but did
not have a clear rationale for services.94 This discrepancy no
longer exists. Companies are now distanced from their clients
and their workers by technology, creating information gaps,
while the company nevertheless advertises quality, reliability,
and safety in their services—creating implied warranties that shape
client expectations.95
One of the issues earlier courts had with applying strict liability
to services was that the “problem of proof” was not as acute in
non-product cases as it was in products liability cases where the
defendant was many steps removed from the plaintiff.96 Today, the
purveyors of services, the gig companies, are further removed from
the consumer than ever before. Consumers can hire and accept
services from a gig worker without knowing their name, phone
number, qualifications, or any other material information. The gig
company, through its process of onboarding workers, has access to
all of this information and more—though the particular practices of
how the company determines who is and isn’t qualified to deliver
the services is information unavailable to the consumer.
The application of strict liability for services would put the
companies on notice to optimize the risks created by their services.
The optimization would be based not on the recommendations of
92. Id.
93. Id. at 423–28.
94. Id. at 428.
95. Marketing Campaign E-mail from Uber Techs., Inc. (Feb. 10, 2021, 10:57 PM CST)
(on file with author) (touting Uber’s commitment to and investment in rider safety).
96. Powers, supra note 89, at 422–23.
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company ethics advisors, but by the costs of managing a
relationship with society that includes plaintiffs and courts. Gig
companies are the gatekeepers and managers of this system of
incentives for gig workers, and they are therefore the entities best
positioned to mitigate the risks of peer-to-peer services. Because
they sit between the consumer and the providers of services, they
are able to “monitor and channel” the behavior of all users97—a
function which would also permit the companies to protect the
welfare of consumers and the public. With GPS data, user reviews,
and time logging, transportation-focused gig service companies
could effectively enforce speed limits, traffic sign compliance,
pedestrian and cyclist awareness, appropriate rest for drivers,
and other similar tort-mitigating measures. All gig service
companies could mitigate criminal and tortious acts by gig workers
by conducting thorough background checks and providing
appropriate training and other support resources. Still other issues
might be mitigated by appropriate monitoring of workers. The
emphasis in this context is on mitigation, rather than prevention.
Even the best efforts will fall short of complete resolution of
liability, but such efforts could at least bring gig companies in line
with the societal expectations for other companies engaged in the
same industries.
E. One of Many Possible Exclusions for Strict Liability for Services
In cases that have dealt with product-service combinations,
courts have largely avoided the question of strict liability, leaving
commentators to question whether the exemption was for all
product-service combinations or simply an exemption for
professional services.98 While this Note does not explore all of the
justifications and consequences of exempting professional service
providers from strict liability, it merits mention as an adaptation to
the recommended strict liability for services. The problem with
relying on regulation as the impetus, rather than shifting to strict

97. Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1628 (2017) (arguing that Uber and other gig-economy companies use
their power and information to manipulate participants for their own gain).
98. Powers, supra note 89, at 416–18 (citing Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 388–89
(Wis. 1977) (“Where ‘professional’ services are in issue the cases uniformly require that
negligence be shown. We have found no decision of any court applying strict liability to the
rendition of professional medical services.”)).
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liability, was previously discussed in reference to taxi drivers.99 It
is that the gig economy will continue to develop and morph at a
rate faster than regulators are able to meaningfully control. And
while the control may be desired, can the regulators do it in a way
that does not stifle real and desirable innovation? The approach
that encourages the most creativity is to draw the lines of liability
and allow the gig companies to optimize their services to reduce
the potential risk and costs associated with those liabilities. This
approach is not foolproof and may need regulatory adjustments
from time to time.
The primary purposes of extending strict liability to services
may still be largely fulfilled by state licensing and training for
certain skilled services. For many of those gig services, existing
frameworks for licensure already exist.100 For others, there is an
obvious path forward, given existing frameworks in other
jurisdictions or an obvious path to licensure. In fulfilling the
purpose of tort law, such licensure might require training and other
programs to promote safety by the service workers. The licensure
would put the costs on the preventative rather than compensatory
side of the equation, but it would still effectively spread the costs
across all those who benefit from the services in order to achieve
the desired mitigation. The asymmetry of information would be
partially reduced because the requirements for licensure would be
public record and the licensure could require renewals, audits, or
some other form of periodic review—all of this would facilitate the
exchange of information. There would also still exist a framework
for strict liability for services which would apply in situations
where the company failed to meet the requirements of the
professional exception. The last three points of fulfilling
expectations, putting the onus on the party best able to mitigate,
and questions of fairness could all be handled in some degree by
such regulations as well.
This isn’t to suggest that outright exemptions for professionally
licensed providers is equivalent to strict liability nor that other
exceptions are less meritorious. The possibility of adapting the
strict liability for services rule to fit other scenarios is available and
should be evaluated further.

99. Supra Part III.
100. For example, several companies connect skilled trades with homeowners. State
licensing for plumbers, electricians, general contractors, and others should largely fill the need.
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F. The Economics of Strict Liability
The general purpose of extending strict liability to services is
the same as the rationale articulated by the courts that developed
strict liability for products. As Justice Traynor wrote in an early
products liability decision,
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective
products that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer
can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of
others, as the public cannot.101

The net social impact of this ideal may not be quantified
immediately, but scholars have looked at the cost of strict liability
in other settings—including the extension of strict liability to all
forms of tort, thus eliminating the concept of negligence
altogether.102 In their study of the subject, Richard Posner and
William Landes concluded,
If a change in the plaintiff’s activity is unlikely to be an efficient
method of accident avoidance, but a change in the defendant’s
activity is likely to be an efficient method, strict liability is an
attractive rule. It will deter many accidents, and what we have
called the claim cost of strict liability will be reduced.103

Strict liability is attractive and efficient because there is not
a clear path forward for changing the behaviors of potential
gig-company tort plaintiffs, but there is a clear and simple path for
changing the behaviors of the gig companies. This conclusion by
Posner and Landes also brings to light a final point and a return to
the beginning of the Note. Regardless of the type of service being
offered, the strict liability for services must include not just
consumers of the service, but bystanders.
G. Claims by Innocent Bystanders
The adoption of strict liability for service providers answers the
question of liability when the consumer is harmed by a defect in the
101. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
102. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 877 (1981).
103. Id.
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service, but it does not settle the problem of appropriate liability
when the public at large, or bystanders, are harmed by the act. For
this dilemma, the evolution of products liability is again
informative. It wasn’t long after the concept of strict liability for
product defects became widespread that courts began extending
this protection to non-user and non-consumer third parties.104 The
purpose: public policy considerations.105 The lack of a consumerproducer relationship has no bearing on the analysis in a strict
liability claim. While not all jurisdictions provide equivalent
protection for users as for non-users, those extending the protection
have recognized that “[t]here is no adequate rationale or theoretical
explanation why non-users and non-consumers should be denied
recovery against the manufacturer of a defective product. The
reason for extending the strict liability doctrine to innocent
bystanders is the desire to minimize risks of personal injury and/or
property damage.”106 While the Restatement is written to protect
“the user or consumer or . . . his property,” the notes in the
Restatement make clear that it takes no position on the matter of
bystanders.107 And despite the text of the Restatement, there is
widespread agreement in tort law that bystanders are able to
recover for injuries despite a lack of privity or relationship with the
manufacturer.108 This is in line with the public policy objectives of
not only strict products liability, but also tort law generally.
V. SOME ISSUES WITH STRICT SERVICE LIABILITY
Will strict liability for services end innovation? Many have
wondered if any regulation will destroy innovation. And though
innovation is a common argument against interference in the
marketplace, the gig economy may be, itself, a product of
regulation.109 Existing regulations created sizable room to reduce
costs and improve services. Undoubtedly a shift to strict liability
104. See Frederic N. Schneider, Tort: Recovery by a Bystander in Strict Liability, 8
TULSA L.J. 216 (1972) (noting at the time, a “contemporary trend toward consumer
protection . . . [extending] strict tort liability to manufacturers and retailers for injuries
caused by their defective products to non-user and non-consumer third parties”).
105. Id.
106. Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. 1969).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cvt. (1) (AM. L. INST. 1965).
108. Michael J. Toke, Restatement (Third) of Torts and Design Defectiveness in American
Products Liability Law, 5 CORNELL J.L.& PUB. POL’Y 239, 256 (1996).
109. Supra Part I. Admittedly the claim is made that such innovation to avoid regulation
is less innovation and more creative maneuvering.
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will encourage more maneuvering by gig companies to shield
themselves from liability; however, unlike independent contractor
status—the two-edged sword that doubly benefits gig companies—
maneuvering around strict liability would require risk prevention
measures that advance general social welfare. Rather than
innovating ways around existing regulations, that creativity could
be utilized to produce safety solutions and improved risk
mitigation. Cost cutting and optimization could still motivate
innovation, but towards greater efficiency rather than reduced fees,
fines, and judgements.
There are also lingering questions remaining about
applicability. What about companies such as Expedia and other
middlemen which merely connect consumers to producers, but not
under the guise of offering a service? On the surface, this appears
no different than the producer-retailer-consumer relationship that
has developed over the past century. The point of strict liability is
not to create new causes of action against providers or retailers, but
to bring forward the entity that is best situated to address the risks
of its products. In the service space, a cab company that advertises
its service, brands its vehicles, and registers its drivers has taken the
affirmative steps of qualifying a service to the market. These actions
function as consent to be subject to the rules of the marketplace. A
company like Uber might suggest that it is merely the “retailer” of
ridesharing service providers.
But the independent drivers have not assented to the
marketplace—they have assented to Uber. They do not acquiesce
to any terms of market complicity by contracting with Uber—Uber
is the entity engaging with the market. Uber manages the drivers.
Gig services exist for handyman services. They advertise their
offerings, require agreement of terms of service for engaging as
a contractor, and manage the client relationship. These companies
have assented to the marketplace. This can be differentiated
from other services, such as Angie’s List, which provides
recommendations, but neither facilitates client maintenance nor
directs the actions of the service provider, or from services like
Expedia, which intermediate the sale of service-products for
known providers.
A. The Problem with Differentiating Service Providers
There is another class of companies within the gig economy
which does not follow the clean groupings presented above.
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Uber arguably controls the driver both with terms of service and
also by directing the driver to passengers and to passengers’
destinations—managed by Uber. But there are also true ridesharing
companies—companies that setup carpools of strangers who desire
to share a ride, not provide a ride. These services seek to pair two or
more people who are heading in the same direction, say
commuting to work, for greater efficiency. What then of the liability
for these companies? To some extent, the companies direct the
drivers and may even advertise and perform other activities which
suggest they have assented to the requirements of the marketplace.
Many of these types of services even receive kickbacks in the form
of tip-sharing or user fees. Weighing heavily on the liability
analysis are user perception, how the service is advertised, and how
the service is managed. Where Uber markets a cheaper taxi, these
ridesharing services advertise catching a ride with a stranger.110
Control of the provider would also factor into the discussion. While
Uber requires vehicles of certain model years and certain levels of
cleanliness, among other terms for its drivers,111 the average
ridesharing apps do not.112
Like these carpools, other services connect strangers who are
willing to volunteer, or sell, a service or offering, with those
interested in the offer. Many times, these services operate as
tailored forums and provide little in the way of planning, logistics,
or actual pairing of the offeror with the recipient. Popular services
of this type have varied widely in purpose, from services that
connect empty sofas to shoestring budget travelers, to those that
connect gardeners in order to share surplus or unique plant seeds.
The principles of strict service liability need not extend to every
service that brings people together. By focusing on companies that
market services with implied warranties, the test for liability may
evolve but need not interfere with these other ventures.
Finally, it was previously argued that extending existing
principles of vicarious liability would simply push gig companies
closer to the Amazon delivery model of moving the gig workers
further away from the gig company, sheltering liability in
independent LLCs. Wouldn’t strict liability do the same? Rather
than relying on existing principles of vicarious liability which

110. Carpool, WAZE, https://www.waze.com/carpool (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
111. Driver Requirements, supra note 44.
112. Carpool, supra note 110.
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would require adapting long-established precedent of not just
vicarious liability but also corporate liability, the standard for strict
liability would look past the end-provider to the purveyor of the
services and attach liability on the entity that offered the service to
the marketplace, regardless of who provided it. This approach
provides an adequate avenue for bringing claims against gig
companies, regardless of the number of corporations between the
company and the tort victim.
VI. CONCLUSION
Service providers are the new producers. In this information
age, we no longer must engage with the companies we contract
with for services. Instead, we engage with the worker sent to do the
task. This change in the privity structure of the service economy has
necessitated a continuation of the liability evolution that started
when retailers first started disconnecting consumers from
manufacturers. Extending strict liability to include those who
market services provides a reasonable recourse to address the
escalating harms that are caused by those service providers and
creates a system that incentivizes desired behaviors.
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